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I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation is a process for resolving disputes as old as disputes
themselves. Today, mediation serves increasingly as an alternative to
litigation. In a mediation, the partips, "together with the assistance of a
neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to
develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement
to accommodate their needs." t  In its original form, mediation is
doubly voluntary: it is entered into voluntarily and it produces a result
which is solely based on the parties' agreement. However, in recent
years there has been an increasing trend towards mandating mediation
before a case goes to trial. 2  Mandating mediation removes the"
voluntariness of participation but leaves intact the voluntariness of the
agreement. 3  Pressure to agree to a settlement would be fundamentally
incompatible with mediation, because it would eliminate voluntariness as
the basis for the result.
4
The trend towards mandatory mediation has raised issues of both
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Frank Sander, Christian Buehring-Uhle and Sarah Gross for their helpful comments on
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1. JAY FOLBERG & ALLISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION 7 (1984). It is important to
distinguish mediation from other techniques of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) such as
the summary jury trial (SIT), which is an abbreviated hearing before real jurors Who return
in advisory verdict. For information about the importance of distinguishing among the
different ADR processes, see Craig A. McEwen, Pursuing Problem-Solving or Predictive.
Settlement, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 77 (1991); Carrie.Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement
in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR, " 19 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1, 40, 44 (1991).
2. See infra part II for current areas of mandatory mediation.
3. The process can still be called mediation, as long as the oitcome depends entirely
on the parties' agreement. The failure to draw a distinction between mandatory process and
foreed agreement explains the rejection of mandatory mediation by the Supreme Court of
Georgia in Department of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 380 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 1989).
• 4, Mandated Participation and Settlement Coercion:.Dispute Resolution as it Relates
to the Courts, SPIDR REP., Jan. 5, 1991.
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law and policy. The policy issue is whether and where mediation should
be made mandatory. The legal issues concern the validity, content and
enforcement of provisions mandating mediation. In sum, the problem is
to determine where and how to make mediation mandatory.
Mediation can be mandated by statute, court rule, individual court
ruling or by a contractual mediation clause.s It has been mandated in
areas as diverse as family disputes, medical malpractice suits and
producer-distributor disputes. Legislatures, courts and parties mandating
mediation for certain controversies must confront two questions: first,
whether the controversy is suitable for mediation; and second, whether it
is appropriate to mandate mediation of the controversy. This Article
suggests criteria for answering both questions. It argues that mediation
should only be mandated if the type of dispute will be particularly suitable
for mediation, and if there are barriers which prevent the parties from
attempting mediation voluntarily themselves even though it would be in
their interest.
The perspective on mandatory mediation proposed here differs from
much of the current discussion on the subject. The starting point of many
current analyses is the court system.6 Mediation is envisaged as one of
the alternatives to trial for controversies that have already become legal
disputes, crowding the overburdened courts' dockets. This Article looks
at mediation from the perspective of parties who have an ongoing
relationship and need a process for resolving controversies. From this
perspective, the Article takes a fresh look at the main questions about
mandatory mediation: where is it appropriate and how should it be
shaped and enforced? The first section of the Article contains an
overview of the areas in which mediation is or can be mandated. The
second section develops criteria for assessing when it is appropriate to
mandate mediation. The third section applies the criteria to the different
areas and suggests when mandatory mediation is appropriate as a matter
of policy and valid legally, what specific content a duty to mediate entails,
and how that duty may be enforced.
5. See infra part II.
6. See, e.g., Note, Mandatory Mediation and Sumnmary Jury Trial: Guidelines for
Ensuring Fair and Effective Processes. 103 HARV. L. Ruv. 1086 (1990); SPIDR REP.,
supra note 4; G. Thomas Eisele, The Case Against Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR
Programs, 75 JUDICATURE 34 (1991).
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II. CURRENT AREAS OF MANDATORY MEDIATION
Mediation can be mandated by statute, court rule, individual court
ruling, or by a contractual mediation clause. This section surveys the
areas of law7 in whaich mediation is mandated by one of these schemes.
The main areas in which mediation is currently mandated by statute
ares labor and family 0 disputes, medical -malpractice, 1 farm mortgage
foreclosure,' 2 agricultural producer-distributor bargaining,t3 civil rights
disputes, 4 and certain consumer warranty cases.
Court rules may require mediation as a prerequisite to filing a suit,
either for certain categories of cases (often authorized by special statutes)
or for all cases, sometimes below a certain monetary threshold. 6
Individual court rulings sometimes mandate mediation (or some
other form of ADR) on the basis of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure's (FRCP) Rule 1617 or a more specific state statute.18
Contracts in different areas may contain mediation clauses. Such
clauses are often found in construction contracts, automobile
distributorships, partnerships and employment contracts (for example,
clauses concerning employee grievances). Contractual mediation clauses
mandate mediation when a dispute arises, not unlike a statutory mandate.
However, the initial decision to mandate mediation for disagreements is
7. While mandates by law or local rule generally apply to classes or areas of disputes,
mandates by individual rulings and clauses mostly apply to individual cases. However, it is
still possible to determine the areas or classes of disputes in which most of these individual
cases lie.
8. See the extensive list in NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION:
LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE, app. B (1989).
9. For collective bargaining mediation, see 29 U.S.C.S. § 173 (Law. Co-op. 1975 &
Supp. 1991).
10. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 752 (West Supp. 1989).
11. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2851-59 (West Supp. 1989).
12. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (repealed effective July
1, 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 654A.6 (West Supp. 1989).
13. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 12004 (West Supp. 1989).
14. See generally Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in
Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 482, 590 (1987).
15. A mandatory, mediation-like process is authorized by federal statute in 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(a) (1988). However, this process only becomes mandatory between seller and
consumer if it .is approved by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the consumer is
notified. Although authorized by statute, this resembles more the contractual mediation
clauses discussed below than a statutory requirement.
16. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.74 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992).
17. However, a recent decision narrowed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 as a
basis for mandatory mediation. See, e.g., Department of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 380
S.E.2d 265, 268 (Ga. 1989) (parties can be "referred" to mediation, but if "either party
determines that none of the issues can be resolved by mediation, litigation will proceed
according to the schedule set by the trial court").
18. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102 (West Supp. 1990).
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not made by the legislature or by the courts, but by the parties
themselves. Nonetheless, it makes sense to discuss mediation clauses
along with statutory mediation mandated by legislatures or courts because
regulators. should apply the same criteria parties would apply before
agreeing on a mediation clause: does mediation promise more benefits
than risks to the parties?
III. PROPOSED CRITERIA FOR MANDATORY MEDIATION
Mediation should only be mandated for those cases in which the
potential benefits to the parties from a mediated agreement will outweigh
the costs and risks of mandating mediation.. The goal of the criteria for
determining when mediation should be made mandatory is not only to
reduce the number of cases that are unmediated although mediation would
be beneficial, but also to reduce the number of cases in which mediation
is improperly imposed.
The argument that mandating mediation only obliges the parties to
try. once and thus is no real imposition is mistaken. Even trying
mediation can have substantial cost in terms of time and displacement.
More importantly, as a matter of principle, the introduction of any
freedom-limiting duty into the legal system needs to be justified. Before
mandating mediation, the principle of proportionality requires balancing
the possible benefits from mediation against the costs of imposing
mediation.1 9 Accordingly, mediation should only be mandated if: .first,
the controversy is suitable for mediation; and second, it is proportional to
mandate mediation of the controversy.
This section proposes general criteria to answer whether
controversies are suitable for mediation and whether it is appropriate to
mandate mediation. General criteria are most suitable because legislatures
and courts have to rely on general criteria (such as "disputes below a
value of $1000" or "medical malpractice claims") when they mandate
mediation in laws or rules. Although a screening process that looks at
each case individually can use a more detailed and complex set of criteria
to assess the cases, it could still use the following proposed criteria as
guidelines. Mediation should only be mandated: .(A) for the appropriate
types of controversies, and (B) only when power imbalances between the
parties are insignificant or can be remedied, and (C) only to overcome
certain existing barriers to the use of mediation. These criteria for
mandating mediation can be applied to the areas where mediation is or
19. The same principle is expressed in the law of remedies by balancing equities and
hardships. See D.B. DOBBS, REMEDIES 52-54 (1973).
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may be mandatory. As a result, a framework for assessing where and
how to mandate mediation emerges.
A. Type of Controversy
In a controversy, the parties' discussion can concentrate primarily
on their rights or on their interests!' To resolve a dispute about rights, a
mediation can be "rights-based"2' and focus on helping the parties to
develop a shared perception of their respective rights or to arrive at a
compromise between their differing perceptions of their rights. To
resolve a conflict about interests, the mediation can be "interest-based" '
and focus on finding an agreement that accommodates both parties'
interests or on arriving at a compromise consisting of concessions which
are valued more highly by the receiving .party than by the party making
them. A -mediation can also try to reorient the parties' discussion from
rights to interests and then proceed with an "interest-based" approach."
In many cases the mediation is about both rights and interests. However,
even in most of those hybrid cases one element tends to dominate and
lend a focus to the parties' discussion.2
Mediation provides parties with an opportunity to reconcile interests
("problem-solving"),2 an opportunity courts are not designed to supply.
Mediation is a process in which "the emphasis is not on who is right or
20. WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTEs RESOLVED 3-9 (1988). Ury, Brett
and Goldberg introduce a third element, power, which will be discussed infra, part ILB.
The relationship between rights and interests is certainly a complicated one and cannot be
fully explored here. For the purpose of understanding disputes, one may think of rights as
interests which are protected by law. Because the legal protection has to take the form of a
general rule, it has to generalize the underlying interests and cannot embody-all the possible
interests of each particular case. As a result, rights take on a focused, universal, and
explicit nature which distinguishes them from the multiple, shifting, and unique interests
present in each particular case. In a given case, a party's rights may only coincide partly
with.her underlying interests. However, in some cases rights represent the party's interests
which are at issue quite well. In these cases, the party may be well advised to focus on her
rights instead of (unprotected) interests.
21. Id. at 6; MeEwen, supra note 1, at 78-80, esp. n.17.
22. See URY et al., supra note 20, at 6; McEwen, supra note I, at 78, esp. n.17. See
also Lon Fuller, Mediation, It's Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971).
23. URY et al., supra note 20, at 49; McEwen, supra note 1, at 86.
24. URY et al., supra note 20, at 6. One part of this paper (part III.A) will try to
determine which kinds of cases lend themselves to a more interest-based form of mediation.
25. McEwen, supra note 1, at 79:
In problem-solving settlement . . . the central goal is
not to predict what a court would do. Instead the standard for
a good outcome is whether or not it meets the needs and
responds to the underlying interests of the parties and,
perhaps, appears generally "fair" or *just." . . . Mediation, in
particular, has been advocated as a problem-solving process..
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wrong .. but rather upon establishing a workable solution that meets the
participant's unique needs. "26 Mediation assists the parties in creating
options for mutual gain that can be the basis of an agreement. 27  It is,
therefore, particularly well-suited for dealing with interest-centered
controversies or for reorienting disputes towards reconciling interests. It
can perform this function best if the parties' controversy occurs in the
context of an ongoing relationship which provides shared interests in the
future. However, interest-based mediation will usually not be productive
where the controversy is centered on the retrospective assessment of legal
claims arising from an isolated past interaction, such as a traffic accident.
If the parties have no future dealings with each other, it is unlikely that
shared interests or opportunities for mutually beneficial arrangements
arise. The parties' discussion will stay focused on the ex-post assertion of
rights.
In rights-centered controversies with little or no opportunities for
reconciling interests (for example, claims arising from a traffic accident),
rights-based mediation, much more than interest-based mediation,
performs an essentially judicial task. Mediation is only beneficial to the
parties if it is a better process for discovering and acknowledging their
respective rights than adjudication. This assessment in turn depends on
the effectiveness with which the judicial system performs its central task
of determining rights. In a situation of overburdened courts and scarce
public finances, mediation may perform better than the courts.
Additionally, mediators may serve the public interest by relieving the
courts of some of their burden.
Mandatory rights-based mediation is open to a host of unique
objections, however. The most important objection is that courts may be
better equipped than mediators to determine parties' rights,4 On an
institutional level, mandating rights-based mediation raises the objection
that it may result in delaying or avoiding necessary reforms of the court
system. This objection cannot be raised for interest-based mediation,
because the courts were never meant to protect the kinds of interests
involved in interest-based mediation.
While there may still be good reasons for mandating mediation or
26. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 10.
27. Where the parties have already tried to negotiate an agreement, mediation can be
mandated to assist them in creating options. See DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 811 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1987).
28. The mediator will often be put in a situation of "reality-testing" the parties on the
basis of his own prediction of how a court would decide their case. The parties then have
an incentive to accept this "determination" of their rights. It is open to question whether
this process is superior to a court decision.
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some other "predictive settlement procedure"" in certain rights-centered
cases, this Article concentrates on the undisputable benefits that mediation
can produce in situations that permit interest-based solutions. It therefore
proposes a framework for identifying interest-based controversies for
mandatory mediation.
B. Power Balance Between the Parties
In cases of considerable power disparities between the parties,
mediation is unlikely to be an adequate dispute resolution process unless it
can be modified to compensate for the power disparities. The reason
mediation is ineffective in these circumstances is that mediation does not
emphasize rights (which might empower the weaker party) and has a
tendency to preserve 'power imbalances." ° A good example is domestic
violence cases. Family disputes are generally suited to mediation, but
they should not be mediated where there is a significant power imbalance
between the parties, as in domestic violence cases.
31
In other cases where power imbalances are significant, mediation
may be modified in order to empower the weaker party. One
empowerment example is the Minnesota Farmer-Lender Mediation Act,Z
which provides debtors free financial analyst and farm advocate assistance
in mediations with creditors,' most commonly banks.
C. Barriers to Mediation
Mandating mediation is justified only if there are barriers preventing
the use of mediation in cases that would benefit from it, and if mandating'
mediation is the least intrusive measure of overcoming -these bariiers.
29. McEwen, supra note 1, at 78. Other methods of nonbinding ADR such as
nonbinding arbitration, summary jury trial or early neutral evaluation (about these methods,
see STEPHEN GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 282-85 (1985), ROGERS & McEWEN,
supra note 8, at 10) may actually be superior to rights-based mediation in resolving disputes
centered around rights. It is important to evaluate the merits of these different methods
separately. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1. at 44.
30. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 244; CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE
MEDIATION PROCESS 30 (1986); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 120
(1983).
31. Kelly Rowe, Comment, The Limits of the Neighborhood Justice Center: Why
Domestic Violence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34 EMORY L.J. 855 (1985). Another
reason why these cases are usually unsuited to mediation is the importance of sending a clear
"message" to other (potential) offenders that violence will be punished and cannot be
mediated like any othei difference. See A.E. Menard & A.J. Salius, Judicial Response to
Family Violence: The Importance of Message, 7 MEDIATION L.Q. 293 (1-990).
32. "MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 583.20-583.32 (West 1988 &'Supp. 1992) (repealed
effective July 1, 1993).
33. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (repealed effective
July 1, 1993).
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'This subsection examines the wide variety of barriers which exist that
prevent a more extensive use of mediation.34
1. Differences in Information and in the Assessment of the Situation
Often the parties do not have equal information about the -facts
underlying their dispute or do not share similar assessments of the
situation. ' For example, a manufacturing company may not know why
sales by a dealer dropped, and may not agree with the dealer's assessment
that the product is not priced competitively.
Often, these differences are barriers to a resolution of the dispute,
3 6
but not barriers to entering into mediation." In cases where the parties
assess the situation differently, making mediation mandatory is not
justified by the barrier because the mandate to mediate can only overcome
barriers to entering the process. The barriers to come to an agreement
are not overcome by a mandate to mediate, unless it creates pressure to
settle. Such pressure would be fundamentally incompatible with
mediation. s
In some cases, one party may reject mediation because it feels
disadvantaged by its lack of information. In these cases, mandating
mediation could overcome the barrier. However, other less intrusive
measures are probably superior. Instead of forcing a party to go to
mediation feeling unprepared, the mediation process could be modified to
offer the party additional information, such as from a neutral expert.
2. A Lack of Interest in a Speedy Resolution of the Dispute
Sometimes, one of the parties has an interest in dragging its feet on
any attempt to resolve the situation (such. as a defendant who knows that
the plaintiff will probably not be able to sustain protracted litigation). If
the status quo is better for that party than any possible litigation or
mediation result, that party may pursue a strategy of holding'out. This is
not just a barrier to mediation, but a much more pervasive problem that
34. For an overview, see GOLDBERG et al., supra note 29, at 485-89, 546. Some of
the obstacles are discussed in Department of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 380 S.E.2d 265,
267 (Ga. 1989).
35. It should be noted that sometimes different assessments of a situation can also
make it easier to agree. If one party thinks that prices will rise and the other one thinks that
prices will fall, they may make a fixed price commitment part of an agreement.
36. URY et al., supra note 20, at 16.
37. However, one party may not enter mediation because lacking some information it
feels at a disadvantage in mediation. In that case, mandating mediation does not solve the
pr6blem. Rather, a mediation process should be offered, which allows the party to obtain
additional information, such as from a neutral expert.
38. See supra part I.
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cannot adequately be addressed by mandating mediation. Where one party
has no incentive to resolve the case, it does not make sense to mandate its
participation in mediation, because it will have no interest in making
mediation work.. This barrier could only be overcome by pressure to
settle, which is incompatible with the spirit of mediation.
3. A Lack of Communication Between the Parties
Deficient communication can be both a substantive and a procedural
obstacle to agreement. If the parties fail to agree on a process which
would be beneficial for them because they do not sufficiently communicate
before going to court,. a duty to mediate can overcome this obstacle.
However, there may be less intrusive means to overcome the
communication barrier to mediation, such as mandating a mere
consultation between the parties about the possibility of using mediation.
4. Skepticism About Mediation
The parties and the lawyers advising them may be skeptical about
mediation. This barrier may be tackled by education and information
about mediation. Mandating this relatively new process, however, is
probably not the least intrusive means to spread information about
mediation. Instead, a low-intensity duty to mediate, such as the
mandatory attendance at an information and screening meeting,39 may be
warranted in areas where skepticism about mediation is widespread.
Skepticism can also be present in all of the areas described in Part
II.A. In those cases, mandatory mediation is warranted to the extent
necessary, provided the controversy is suitable and no significant power
imbalances exist.
5. Liiwyers' Self-Interest in an Adversarial Legal Process
This barrier is qualitatively different from the previous one because
it implies that some attorneys will eschew mediation not just because of
skepticism, but because of their self-interest, even where it conflicts with
the client's interests. This conflict of interest or "agency problem"40 may
be quite pervasive. The flipside of mediation's potential for reducing
legal costs is a threat to lawyers' revenues. Few clients have the
39. In practice, much can depend on how the screening meeting is run. If it is run
by the judge who would also decide the case and he strongly suggests mediation for the
case, the effect may be the same as a full-fledged duty to try mediation.
40. For a systematic discussion of agency problems, see PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). "
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information and expertise to judge whether an attorney opposes mediation
in the client's or in the attorney's interests. While mandating mediation is
the least intrusive means to tackle this agency problem,4' it is unclear how
effectively it can solve it. The answer depends largely on the content and
enforcement of the duty to mediate, which will be discussed below.
6. Fear that Suggesting Mediation Signals Weakness
In a situation where both parties would like to try mediation but do
not suggest it because the other party may read it as a sign of weakness,
mandatory mediation may be the best way to break the impasse.
Anticipation of this kind of stalemate is often a motivation for mediation
clauses.
A related barrier is the fear of destabilizing other relationships by
agreeing to an ad hoc mediation in one case. A party that has a number
of similar relationships (for example, contractual relationships) might fear
that the sudden willingness to mediate a question may be read by its other
partners as yielding on the substance of the question, which could turn out
to be very costly. Engaging in a mandated or previously agreed-upon
mediation does not send this signal. It may thus avoid the drawbacks of-a
voluntary ad hoc mediation.
IV. WHEN AND HOW TO MANDATE MEDIATION
The three criteria for mandating mediation (type of controversy,
power balance, barriers) developed in the previous section can now be
applied to the areas where mediation is or may be mandatory. As a
result, a framework for assessing when and how to mandate mediation
emerges.
A. When to Mandate Mediation
Mediation should only be mandated: first, for the appropriate
types, of controversies; second, only when power imbalances are
insignificant or when they can be remedied; and third, only when the
mandate is designed to overcome certain barriers to the use of mediation.
41. Another way to solve the agency problem would be to restructure lawyers'
incentives so as to eliminate the revenue bias in favor of litigation. However, this seems
much more difficult in practice than mandating mediation.
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1. Type of Controversy
Medical malpractice suits involve mainly questions of rights
connected to a single encounter. Using the criteria laid out above, they
do not constitute an appropriate area for mandatory mediation. The same
is true for many small claims. A general requirement of mediation for all
cases below a certain dollar value is therefore inappropriate as well. A
rule that allows the screening and referral to mandatory mediation of all
the cases below a certain value is at least arbitrary. It risks mandating
mediation in many cases that are inappropriate because careful screening
may be too costly and because the court's incentives are tilted towards
referral. Finally, civil rights cases are appropriate for'mediation if their
focus is on an ongoing relationship rather than the respective rights from a
one-time situation.
On the other hand, family and labor relations, distribution,
construction, lease, long-term energy, and credit contracts, and
partnerships are areas that possess these characteristics and are
particularly suited for mediation. In- cases where the contract contains a
mediation clause, a strong presumption exists that the area is suited to
mediation because the parties will probably only provide .for mandatory
mediation if they expect to benefit from it. Legislators and courts may
have more diverse incentives to mandate mediation, which may not always
square with the interests of the parties, such as the desire to reduce
courts' backlog of cases.
2. Power Balance
Cases of domestic violence in families and most instances of race or
sex discrimination in an institutional setting are examples of power
imbalances that should caution against mandating mediation in these
contexts. The power imbalances go beyond differences in economic
resources and access 'to information, and are difficult to address by
adapting the mediation process to support the disadvantaged side.
Additionally, it may be in the public interest to address extremely,
"imbalanced" disputes with a strong judicial "message."'
The superior power of a bank-mortgagee over a farmer-mortgagor
42. However, there may be other less desirable reasons for including a mediation
clause in a contract. One may be that the stronger party has pressured the weaker party into
the acceptance of such a clause because it believes that its superior power will enable it to
use mediation to its advantage. This problem has to do with power imbalances and will be
addressed in the next subsection.
43. See Silver, supra note 14, at 590. Additionally, civil rights cases will often
suffer from power imbalances which make them unsuited to mediation.
44. See Menard & Salius, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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or the power imbalance between a consumer and a producer when it
comes to product warranty, however, can be counterbalanced by adding
features to the mediation process. Mandatory mediation can be
appropriate if these mechanisms are put in place that provide the weaker
side with informational or economic support or other means to redress the
imbalance. Many of the existing legal provisions for mandatory
mediations do this. Empirical research should be conducted to monitor
how effective these mechanisms are in redressing the power imbalances.
Mediation clauses present a special problem in this area. There
cannot be an automatic presumption that the parties will take care of
p6wer imbalances. A mediation clause may be an instrument the more
powerful party uses to sanction an unfettered exercise of its power in any
controversy. Clauses mandating mediation in consumer contracts or
dealership agreements, especially in contracts of adhesion should be
subject to close scrutiny. 46 The more comprehensive the mediation effort
such clauses require,47 the more important it will be that they provide
some mechanism to redress the power imbalance.
3. Barriers to Mediation
As examined earlier, four of the different possible barriers to
mediation may warrant mandating mediation: 1) a lack of communication
between the parties about a process to resolve the dispute, 2) skepticism
about mediation, 3) the fear that suggesting mediation may 'signal
weakness, and 4) the self-interest of lawyers in not using mediation. This
subsection examines in which of the current areas of mandatory mediation
described in Part II these barriers are likely to be present, thus warranting
45. Counseling can help complainants in civil rights cases. See Silver, supra note 14,
at 591. Another means can be to allow the other side to organize for the purpose of these
controversies, such as in labor negotiations and mediations. See GOLDBERG et al., supra
note 29, at 498. The problem will often be that no such organization exists at the time
when mandating mediation is contemplated. A solution may be to phase in mandatory
mediation slowly and allow an organization to grow with it.
46. Mediation clauses in contracts of adhesion have routinely been upheld in disputes
involving automobile dealerships by the courts of this land. See DeValk Lincoln Mercury,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 811 F.2d 326. (7th Cir. 1987) (mediation clause in a contract of
adhesion upheld against an unconscionability challenge); Saturn Distribution Corp. v.
Williams, 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990), cern. denied, Ill S. Ct. 516 (1990) (upholding a
mediation clause against a Virginia law prohibiting automobile manufacturers and dealers
from entering* into an agreement that contained mandatory alternative dispute resolution
provisions such as Saturn's by holding Virginia law conflicted with the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) and was preempted by the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
VI).
As a general matter, the analysis of the validity of a mediation clause should not be
automatically the same as for an arbitration clause, because a mediator does not dispose of
the same leverage to redress imbalances as an arbitrator.
47. See infra part IV.B about the different possible intensities of a duty to mediate.
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the mandates imposed.
The first three barriers (lack of communication, skepticism, fear of
signalling weakness) can all be present in all of the areas described in Part
II. Mandating mediation is warranted to the extent necessary to overcome
these barriers if the other two criteria (type of controversy, power
imbalance) are satisfied.
The third barrier, fear of suggesting mediation, may be especially
strong in areas where voluntary ad hoc mediation of an individual
controversy may send a signal of weakness which destabilizes other
relationships. Areas where one side tends to have many similar
relationships which might be affected are labor contracts, distributorships,
consumer warranties and mortgage foreclosures. Mandating mediation
can avoid some of the negative spillovers Which an ad hoc decisiron for
mediation may create. Engaging in a mandated or previously agreed-up6n
.mediation does not send this signal.
The fourth barrier, lawyers' self-interest in not using mediation, will
be particularly present in areas that have potential for protracted high
stakes litigation, generating high fees. Large construction and dealership
contracts are examples. Some forms of shareholder litigation4e and
medical malpractice cases would be further examples. However, as
discussed earlier, 9 these areas are not well-suited to mediation and the
mere presence of a barrier to mediation does not warrant mandating
mediation. In some other areas, like mortgage foreclosures or consumer
warranties ("lemon" cases), where lawyers' fees tend to be low, lawyers'
interests will not be a barrier at all.
Different areas have different barriers to mediation. The most
important barriers that warrant mandating mediation (lack of
communication, skepticism, fear of signalling weakness, and lawyers'
self-in.terest) are not present in all areas. This implies that in some areas,
such as distributorship contracts, mandating mediation is more justified
than in other areas, such as in small diverse contracts or low stakes" civil
rights controversies.
B. How to Mandate Mediation
Where mandating mediation is justified according to the criteria laid
48. For example, shareholders' derivative suits, where the shareholder seeks to
enforce a right of the corporation against its officers and directors. Lawyers are often the
driving force behind these suits, acting as "private attorney generals," even though their
personal motivation is private gain, not public (or other shareholders') welfare. See
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plainiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of LdIw Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).
49. See supra part IV.A.
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out above, legislators, courts or parties still face the question of how best
to mandate it. This question can be divided into three parts: first, how
should the duty to participate be established - by a general rule or by a
rule that gives the courts the power to mandate mediation, or by
individual mediation clauses; second, what should be the content of the
duty; and third, how should this duty be enforced.
In answering these questions, the principle of proportionality should
be applied: the range of actions mandated and the sanctions inflicted to
enforce the duty should be proportional to the barriers to mediation that
hav to be overcome in the concrete type of relationship.-"
1. Creation of the Duty
At least three different ways to establish a duty to mediate exist: by
a general rule (statute or court rule), by individual referral (by a court),
or by a contractual mediation clause. This subsection examines the
advantages and disadvantages of each method.
One way to create a duty to mediate is to have the parties draft a
mediation clause that specifies from the outset the procedure for
addressing controversies that may arise. A mediation clause is the most
desirable way because it allows tailoring the solution to the individual
relationship without creating the delay and uncertainty associated with an
individual evaluation by a court after a dispute has been brought there.
However, parties may not consider mediation clauses because they do not
take into account the possibility of disputes when drafting the contract, or
because barriers already prevent the inclusion of a mediation clause in the
contract.
The second best method is to create the duty to mediate by a
general rule that applies, for example, to all relationships in a certain area
such as leases or farm mortgages. The advantage of a general rule over
an open rule that allows case-by-case referral by the court is that the
parties know in advance that they are required to mediate. This
knowledge will probably affect the way parties conduct their controversies
even before going to court, and may decrease the overall level of
adversarial behavior in the relationship. The only drawback of a general
rule is that it cannot fit all cases equally well without losing its clarity.
To soften the rigidity of a general rule, parties could be allowed to
50. There are many justifications for the application of the principle of proportionality
in this instance. One is that besides the unwarranted barriers to mediation there may be
valid reasons for a party not to try mediation. Any "overkill" in the duty to participate in
mediation unnecessarily increases the risk of weeding out valid reasons like the desire to
establish a precedent quickly or avoid the costs of mediation.
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jointlys1 "opt out" of the mandated mediation before it has started. A
statute can allow opting out either at the beginning of the relationship (for
example, by deferring to a clause in the contract permitting opt outs), or
when the dispute has arisen. Allowing the parties to opt out when a
dispute arises has the disadvantage that some of the old barriers to ad hoe
mediation may reappear: skepticism, fear of showing weakness and
lawyers' interests may lead to opting out once a dispute has arisen. Given
these barriers and the already restrictive criteria proposed here for
mandating mediation by a general rule, only opting out at the beginning of
the relationship should be provided. This rule would essentially declare
valid "negative" mediation clauses and might be a good way to stimulate
active consideration of the role of mediation by the parties early on in
their relationship. However, it might also allow lawyers' interests and
skepticism to stymie mediation from the outset. Opt out features can thus
soften a general rule, but at a cost. The necessity of opt out features is
questionable because, as will be shown below, a general rule does not
have to sacrifice the principle of proportionality.
Finally, a third way to create a duty to mediate is by individual
evaluation of each dispute to determine whether there is a duty to mediate
and how far it goes. This is the least preferable solution because it
creates more uncertainty before the parties go to court aid resolves such
uncertainty only late in the dispute. The advantage of an individual
evaluation is that an experienced neutral, the judge, can adjust the duty to
the circumstances of the case. This is necessary in areas where there is a
substantial risk of power imbalances that are not counterbalanced by the
design of the process. The screening can at the same time be used to
screen out cases in which even voluntary mediation may be undesirable.
Domestic violence in family disputes is an example where individual
screening of cases may be the only solution.-
Individual evaluation, although it compromises the effectiveness of
the duty to mediate, would perhaps always be the best guarantee for an
adequate, proportional duty in each case. However, proportionality does
not mean that in each case the- costs of mediation have to be compared
with the potential benefits in order to determine the duty to mediate.
Such a case-by-case analysis would make it impossible for the parties to
know with some certainty what their duties are. The resulting uncertainty
would defeat the whole purpose of mandatory mediation by opening up
another field of controversy and perhaps even spawning "satellite
51. A unilateral opt out possibility is equivalent to not having a duty because the
refusal to mediate, then, has to be understood as an opting out.
52. This is suggested by Rowe, supra note 31, at 905.
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litigation. -3 The proportionality analysis proposed here should be applied
by legislators or policymakers to guide them how and when. to mandate
mediation by general rules for certain types of cases. s' It should also be
applied by parties who contemplate drafting a mediation clause.
2. Content of the Duty
The duty to mediate can encompass four different forms of action:
1) attendance at a screening session, 2) presence at the mediation session,
3) provision of information, and 4) a good faith effort to resolve the
controversy through the mediation.
Attendance at a screening session in which information about
mediation is given and in which cases are screened for their potential for
mediation is a very low-intensity duty. It may not even be called
"mandatory mediation," because no mediation effort is made at the
screening session. However, the screening session can serve to overcome
some barriers to mediation such as a prior lack of communication between
the parties or skepticism of mediation, thus becoming a mandatory first
step that may lead to a voluntary participation in mediation. This
low-intensity duty has the advantage of keeping the duty to mediate
proportional to barriers which are not very serious or can be overcome by
means other than mandating mediation. s
The presence of both sides at the mediation session is a prerequisite
for any mediation effort. However, even this basic requirement is open to
interpretation. It can mean that the parties need only send a
representative to the mediation session. This will probably be sufficient to
overcome the barrier constituted by mutual fear of signalling weakness. It
can also be understood to require that the representatives have full
settlement authority in all questions relating to the controversy so that they
can meaningfully participate in the process of give and take that
characterizes most successful mediations.56  Parties may send someone
without full authority because they fear showing weakness by committing
to the process or fear signalling a readiness to compromise to
53. This danger is emphasized by ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 8, at 48.
54. See infra part IV.C for an illustration of this approach.
55. See supra parts III.C.1-2.
56. In practice, the presence of an agent with settlement authority on each side is very
important. Courts have required participation of the parties themselves or of representatives
with settlement -authority in mediation. See Semiconductors, Inc. v. Golasa, 525 So. 2d
(Fla. Ct. App. 1988). Courts have also required participation of someone with settlement
authority in ADR efforts at pretrial conferences. See Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat
Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Finally, courts have required attendance of
a person with settlement authority in court-annexed arbitration. See Gilling v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 169 (D.N.J. 1988).
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constituencies. s7 Where strong fear of weakness* or constituency barriers
are present, this more demanding interpretation of the presence
requirement. may thus be warranted. Another, less benign motivation for
sending an agent without settlement authority is to be able to renege on
whatever tentative agreement has been reached in -mediation in order to
extract more concessions in a subsequent 'round of negotiations s
Requiring settlement authority guards against such strategies.
Finally, presence can be understood to mean presence of the parties
in person. s9  The discussion of the dispute among the principals
themselves generally makes mediation much more effective because it puts
the real parties in charge of their dispute. "Party presence may be
required where the countervailing self-interest of lawyers constitutes a
barrier to mediation and thus the lawyers' presence at the table is not
sufficient to give mediation a fair chance.
Beyond presence, the provision of information during the mediation
may be required. Information on the parties' real interests or on the cost
of certain concessions to a party often plays an important role in a
mediation. Parties may be requited to disclose information to the
mediator only in confidential caucuses or to the other.party as well.
Parties may not disclose information, even to the mediator, because they
fear indirectly giving the other parties hints about the strength of their
own position. If both parties have this fear, it is an "inferior equilibrium"
or logjam, very similar to the fear to appear weak. It is a barrier to
mediation that should be overcome. However, there may be other valid
reasons not to provide information, including the cost of the information
and. the intention to use proprietary information as leverage in the
negotiations.' In the latter case, information can influence the power
balance between the parties. Requiring more than answers to the most
basic questions of the mediator in private caucus would therefore risk
substantial costs with relatively little justification. A flexible rule which'
would only allow withholding information that would be protected from
pretrial discovery6' would suffer from difficulties of interpretation and
administration, thus, inviting satellite disputes and thereby increasing rather.
57. Other possible explanations include cost considerations. The opportunity cost of
spending time in mediation may be higher for the type of person who can be entrusted with
-the necessary settlement authority than for a person who just makes nonbinding proposals.
This will be especially likely in larger organizations.
58.. DAVID.A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 307
(1986).
59. See Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en bane); Gilling v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 169 (D.N.J. 1988) tjudicial
discussion of this requirement in other ADR contexts).
60. The latter, however, would not be a reason against disclosure only to the
mediator.
61. See Note, supra note 6, at 1097.
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than reducing controversy. However, in cases of power imbalance a
general, more far-reaching disclosure requirement directed at the more
powerful party may be part of the mechanism designed to adjust the
power balance.2 Parties may design greater disclosure duties in mediation
clauses that specifically address the provision of information."
Finally, the duty to mediate can require parties to make a good faith effort
to resolve the controversy through mediation." The danger of this broad
formulation of the duty to participate is that it may create settlement
pressures, cutting back on the essential voluntariness of agreement in
mediation." The broad interpretation is only warranted where intense
barriers to mediation exist that are likely to stop the parties from
participating in the mediation process, even when they are present at the
mediation session. An example would be a situation where one party
fears that participating in mediation would destabilize a lot of other
relationships.' Even then, ".good faith effort" should only be understood
to exclude total stonewalling in the mediation, because otherwise it will
become indistinguishable from a pressure to settle.
At all four levels, the intensity of the duty to mediate can be
managed effectively by providing time limits for the mediation process.
Court orders or mediation clauses may set an overall time limit for the
mediation process as well as time limits within which a party has to
respond to proposals or provide information. If mandatory mediation is
expedited by time limits and only involves a low time commitment, it is
much less burdensome than if a substantial waiting period is imposed on
other legal remedies in order to give mediation efforts time to work out."8
Time limits are thus additional instruments for fine-tuning the duty to
mediate.
62. An example for this is the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Mediation, see
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (repealed effective July 1, 1993),
discussed in more detail infra, part IV.B.3.
63. See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
In this case, it is very likely that the parties foresaw the logjam and wanted to avoid it.
64. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing it Our: Is This The End of
"Good Mediation?" 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 48, 63 (1991) (a -recent empirical study of
mandatory court-annexed mediation in Florida suggesting that a majority of attorneys and
mediators "believed that the problem of the nonplaying party is best addressed by imposing a
mediation-in-good-faith requirement").
65. This danger is emphasized by ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 8. at 59.
66. See Obermoller v. Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, 409 N.W.2d 229 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (bank feared that mediation statute might force it to mediate in many other
situations as well).
67. See Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397 (Iowa 1989) (a narrow interpretation of
"participation" which practically tolerates "stonewalling").
68. See Department of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 380 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 1989).
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3. Enforcement of the Duty
The enforcement of the duty to participate in mediation has to strike
a balance between reaching efficiency and guarding proportionality.
Efficiency in enforcing mandatory mediation depends primarily on the
deterring effect of the sanction. To avoid spawning satellite litigation, the
sanction should be visible and credible enough to prompt compliance
without court intervention. Proportionality requires, however, refraining
from "overkill" in sanction enforcement and guarding against settlement
pressures.
If the content of the duty to mediate is broadly defined and a party
does not comply, such as by not furnishing information, the costs of the
unsuccessful mediation effort might be imposed on that party. This would
be a proportional sanction because it only shifts the costs incurred in the
process of the mediation to the party that has defeated the purpose of the
mediation.
If -the duty to mediate includes a "good faith effort" to settle the
case, the transmission of a mediator's report to the court may be
considered a good sanction because the court could infer from' it whether
a party "unreasonably" rejected proposals, thus not acting in good faith.
However, this type of sanction would violate the confidentiality of
mediation, clearly create substantial settlement pressures, and would
therefore be disproportional to the aim of getting parties to participate in
mediation.69
In the case of an outright refusal to mediate, no mediation takes
place and the costs incurred may be low. In that case, shifting the costs
of the mediation will not be an effective sanction. However, shifting
instead the costs of the subsequent trial to the person who refused
mediation would not be proportional, since even a good faith mediation
does not necessarily result in a settlement of the case.7" Therefore, in
cases of 'outright refusal to mediate, different levers have to be used as
sanctions, depending on the position of the party. The party who has an
interest in changing something in the relationship (the movant)7 can be
denied access to another forum (the courts, arbitration) to bring the
request for change. This is the lever most existing mandatory, mediation
69. See SPIDR REP., supra note 4. at 16.
70. Here, it is again important to realize that mandatory mediation does not imply a
pressure to settle.
71. This expression is used in a nontechnical sense here, to indicate the party who is
interested in changing the status quo aid who would be the plaintiff in a court action.
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provisions and the courts rely on:*z the court action of a plaintiff is
dismissed or stayed if he did not comply with mandatory mediation. A
less stringent variation on this sanction is to delay the movant's access to
legal remedies. This route is taken by the Minnesota Farmer-Lender
Mediation Act.n
The party who is approached by the movant and who has an interest
in maintaining the status quo (the respondent) is more difficult to sanction
adequately upon refusal to mediate, because many standard sanctions are
not available. Obviously, delaying the availability of other remedies
would favor this party. Giving the mediator the power to proceed without
the party- and have the result be binding (like in arbitration) is not possible
either, because of the nature of mediation. 4 Assessing damages is not
practicable because, given the fact that settlement is not required, the
benefit the movant would have had from the respondent's participation in
the mediation cannot be quantified. Particularly, it cannot be assumed
that mediation would have avoided litigation. The 'only quantifiable
damages are the probable negligible cost and delay the movant incurred
trying to persuade the respondent to participate in mediation. This leaves
as remedies against the respondent specific performance or deprivation of
some other legal advantage upon refusal to mediate. 7s  Specific
performance has been chosen by a federal district court in a case of
mandatory nonbinding arbitration. 76 The Farmer-Lender Mediation Acts
in Minnesota and Iowa deprive the respondent of the advantage of a
mortgage moratorium upon failure to participate in good faith in the
mediation. 77  However, both remedies have problems. Specific
performance is not very practicable and, therefore, will often not be a
72. DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 811 F.2d 326 (7th Cir.
1987); Haertl Wolff Parker, Inc. v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14756 (D.C. Or. 1989); Production Credit Association of Worthington v. Spring Water
Dairy Farm, 407 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1987); Obermoller v. Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul,
409 N.W.2d 229 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
73. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27, subd. 3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (repealed
effective July 1, 1993).
74. The Minnesota mortgage mediation statute, however, contains a provision
according to which the result of a mediation can become binding on other creditors if they
do not attend the mediation session or object according to a certain procedure, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 583.28,'subd. 1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
75. Another alternative is only to "order" the respondent/defendant to mediate but not
to provide any sanction. See Department of Transp. v. City of Atlanta. 380 S.E.2d 265, 268
(Ga. 1989).
76. AMF, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. -456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
77. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27. subd. 4 (b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (repealed
effective July 1, 1993); Bank of Craig v. Hughes, 398 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa Ct. App.
1986).
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credible sanction.7' Taking away substantive legal rights from the
addressee for failure to participate in mediation risks violating
proportionality. Nevertheless, a carefully conceived sanction in terms of
legal disadvantages is probably the best way to enforce .mandatory
mediation against a recalcitrant respondent. The chance to engineer this
sanction is greatest in mediation clauses. They can take into account the
specific interests of the. parties to the contract and the incentive effects that
can be drawn from them.
Finally, the efficiency of any of these sanctions can" be greatly
enhanced by providing a practicable implementation mechanism and by*
spelling out duty and sanction as early and as clearly as possible. The
credibility of the sanction 'can be enhanced by designing a practicable
administration of it. The Minnesota Farmer-Lender Mediation Act
requires the mediator to determine whether a party has not "participated in
mediation in good faith." The courts have been extremely reluctant to
overturn the mediator's findings in this respect, particularly since there
are no records of the mediation -proceedings.79  The advantage of this
mechanism is that it makes the sanction of bad faith more credible. The
danger is that it lends substantial power to the mediator which may be
abused for settlement pressure. Another possibility is, to leave it to the
opposing party to claim the lack of good faith and have a judge decide
about the allegation."
Compliance with mandatory mediation can be enhanced regardless
of the. enforcement mechanism by announcing it early and spelling out its
implications clearly.' "Ideally, the parties ate aware of mediation as the
forum for resolving their controversies throughout the relationship.
Mediation clauses and legal provisions can best spell out the specifics of
the mandatory mediation in advance if they are tailored .to a specific
relationship. The parties will also know earlier* about their duty to
mediate if the duty is already part of their legal relationship than if it is
part of the court's case administration.
78. However, specific performance has been deemed not "a vain order" in the case
of submitting a dispute to nonbinding arbitration. AMF, Ino. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F.
Supp. 456, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
79. Production Credit Ass'n of Worthington v. Spring Water Dairy Farm, Inc., 407
N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1987); Obermoller v. Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, 409 N.W.2d 229
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
80. For a discussion of the different possibilities for implementing a good-faith
requirement see Alfini, supra note 64, at 63-66.
81. A mediation clause should, for example, try to provide as much concrete
guidance in the event of a controversy as possible. See John H. Wilkinson, Contract
Clauses for Nonbinding ADR, in DONOVAN LEIsURE NEWrON & IRVINE ADR PRACTcE
BOOK 267, 271 (John H. Wilkinson, ed. 1990).
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C. Model Mediation Statute and Clause
The following mediation statute and clause may illustrate the use of
the criteria for mandatory mediation laid out in this Article.
1. Mediation Statute
As for the statute, a brief analysis of an already existing mediation
statute that conforms to the criteria developed in this Article may be more
useful than abstractly developing a model mediation statute here.
Therefore, this subsection will analyze the Minnesota Farmer-Lender
Mediation Act (Act) which provides for mandatory mediation proceedings
if a bank wants to foreclose on an agricultural property.82
The type of dispute the Act covers is amenable to interest-based
mediation. The attempt to adjust the terms of a loan occurs within a
long-term relationship where the parties, the bank-creditor and the
farmer-debtor, have a continuing interest in working together. The aim of
the mediation is to try to reach an interest-based debt restructuring before
seizing the property.
The power imbalance that exists between the parties is
acknowledged and counterbalancing provisions are included in the law.
The bank which professionally deals with debt restructurings will have
more access to information and to the necessary skills to influence a
restructuring in its favor. To put the farmer who will lack skills and
information to match the bank's on a more equal footing, the law provides
for a financial analyst to meet with the debtor and for a farm advocate to
assist the debtor free of charge in the proceedings.
The barriers to mediation that are likely to exist in this area are the
bank's fear of creating a precedent of giving in to a debtor in difficulties
which may jeopardize other similar credit relationships. On the farmer's
side, a lack of information and fear of the power imbalance are likely
barriers to mediation. -The law addresses these barriers with the
mandatory mediation requirement.
The creation of the duty through a general rule applicable to all
cases in this specific area is the optimal choice as long as the loan
contracts themselves do not provide for mediation. The content of the
duty is spelled out in detail in the Act. The duty to mediate is intensive
by the standards developed in this Article, since it includes not only the
duty to be present at the mediation session and to provide extensive
82. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 583.26-583.28 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (repealed
effective July 1, 1993). See also Robert M. Lawless, Note, The American Response to
Farm Crises: Procedural Debtor Relief, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1037 (a critical economic
assessment of the statute).
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information,U but also a duty to "engage in mediation in good faith. ""
However, the content of the good faith requirement is for the most part
spelled out in detail which limits its scope. ss  Likewise, the intensity of
the duty is allayed by the strict and detailed timetable that is imposed by
the law:U the debtor must request mediation within fourteen days after
learning of the creditor's desire to foreclose," the mediation must be
scheduled in a notice by the director of the mediation program to all
creditors within ten days,U and the initial mediation meeting must then be
held within twenty days of the notice.89 The whole proceeding regularly
cannot take more than 90 days from the debtor's request for mediation.'
Finally, the Act's enforcement of the duty to mediate is also
consistent with the proposals made in this Article. If the creditor (who is
x
83. The creditor "must provide the debtor ... with copies of notes and contracts for
debts subject to the farmer-lender mediation act and provide a statement of interest rates on
the debts, delinquent payments, unpaid principal balance, a list of all collateral securing
debts, A creditor's estimate of the value of the collateral, and debt restructuring programs
available by the creditor." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26 subd. 5(d) (West 1988 & Supp.
1992).
84. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (repealed effective July
1, 1993).
85. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27 (West 1988) (repealed effective July 1, 1993) subd.
l(a) provides:
The parties must engage in mediation in good faith. Not participating in
good faith includes: (1) a failure on a regular or continuing basis to attend
and participate in "mediation sessions without cause; (2) failure-to provide full
information regarding the financial obligations of the parties and other
creditors . . . (3) failure of the creditor to designate a representative to
participate in the mediati6n with authority to make binding commitments
within one business day to fully settle, compromise; or otherwise mediate the
matter; (4) lack of a written statement of debt restructuring alternatives and a
statement of reasons why alternatives are unacceptable to one of the parties;
(5) failure of a creditor to release funds from the sale of farm product9 to the
debtor for necessary living and farm operating expenses; or (6) other similar
behavior which evidences lack of good faith by the party....
It is doubtful, whether the sweeping subclause (6) is still necessary after the more detailed
specifications of the subclauses (l)-(5). In any event, it should be interpreted narrowly,
because the barriers to mediation in this area would probably not warrant an even more
intensive duty to mediate.
86. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 383.26 subd. 2(a), 3(a), 4(a), 4(c), 8 (West 1988) (repealed
effective July 1, 1993).
87. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26 subd. 2(a) (West 1988) (repealed effective July 1,
1993).
88. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26 subd. 4(a) (West 1988) (repealed effective July 1,
1993).
89. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26 subd. 4(c) (West 1988) (repealed effective July 1,
1993).
90. Exceptions apply when one of the parties has not participated in good faith in the
mediation, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26 subd. 5(e) and § 583.27 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992)
(repealed effective July 1, 1993). These exceptions are in fact sanctions of the failure to
participate in good faith.
91. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26 subd. 5(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (repealed
effective July 1, 1993).
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the movant in. these cases) fails to participate in good faith in the
mediation, he has to pay the debtor's costs and attorney's fees for the
mediation and his remedies can be suspended for an additional period of
180 days. 92 If the debtor does not participate in the mediation or if his
participation lacks good faith, the creditor can pursue his other remedies,
namely seizing the property without further delay.9
2. Mediation Clause
The criteria proposed here can also be applied to design a
mandatory mediation clause. The following model clause" for a franchise
agreement may serve as an example:
§ 1 (a) The parties agree to submit all disputes arising between them
in connection with this franchise agreement to mediation before
pursuing other remedies."
(b) Any party can initiate the mediation process by notifying the
other party of the disputed issue it wishes to submit to mediation.
§ 2 The parties will jointly appoint a mediator from the list of
eligible mediators." If within [20] days of the mediation request the
parties cannot agree on a mediator, the [neutral from industry
association or the American Arbitration Association or the Center for
Public Resources] will appoint a mediator.'
§ 3 (a) Representatives of the parties who have authority to settle the
dispute will attend any mediation sessions the mediator schedules
within 30 days of his appointment. However, such sessions shall not
exceed a total of [20] hours.
(b) The franchisor will provide any information requested by the
franchisee during the mediation about arrangements made with other
franchisees on the issues under dispute.
(c) During the mediation, franchisor and franchisee will continue to
fulfill all their obligations under the contract and not discontinue or
reduce deliveries and routine information exchanges.
92. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27 subd. 3 (West 1988) (repealed effective July 1,
1993).
93. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27 subd. 4 (West 1988) (repealed effective July 1,
.1993).
94. The model clause here is intended to serve as an illustration only and kept as
short as possible. To provide more guidance for the mediation process, a more detailed
clause may be advisable.
95. The clause can also provide for negotiation as a first step before a mediation
procedure is initiated. See Wilkinson, supra note 81, at 270.
96. Such a list would be established by representatives of the franchisor and the
franchisees.
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§ 4 (a)- If the party who has requested mediation does not participate
in the mediation or otherwise does not (onform to the provisions laid
out in this mediation agreement, it is barred. from initiating litigation
or pursuing other remedies for a period of [901 days. During this
period it has to continue to fulfill all its obligations under the
franchise contract. It also has to bear the mediator's fees.
(b) If the party who has received a request to try'mediation does not
participate in the mediation or otherwise does not conform to the
provisions laid out in this mediation agreement, it will have to bear
the full costs of the mediation, including the mediator's fees and the
other side's expenses.
§ 5 If the mediation fails to lead to an agreement of the parties to
settle the dispute within'the period specified in § 3 (a), both parties'
are free to pursue other remedies.' Unless provided otherwise in §
4, each party will bear its costs and the mediator's fees will be borne
equally by both parties.
The type of dispute subject to the clause, disagreements which arise
under a complex contract with considerable duration, is amenable to
interest-based mediation. Further, the cieation of the duty by a clause is
the best way to introduce mandatory mediation in a contractual
relationship.
It is assumed here, that the franchisor has resources that
significantly exceed those of the franchisee, which leads to a power
imbalance between the parties. To redress this imbalance, the clause
asymmetrically requires the franchisor to disclose important information (§
3) and to continue dealing with the franchisee during the mediation (§ 3).
Several barriers to mediation in this area justify drafting a
mandatory rather than an optional mediation clause. On the franchisor's
side, it is the fear to be seen as caving in to a franchisee's pressure which
might make the relationships with many other franchisees more difficult.
On the franchisee's side, it is a lack of information and a likely power
imbalance which may create a reluctance to mediate. If antitrust-related
arguments play a role in the dispute, the franchisee's lawyers may also
have incentives not to use mediation, because litigation may financially be
more attractive for them.
The content of the duty is relatively intensive, especially the
information requirements for the franchisor. However, there is no general
"good faith participation" requirement because the barriers to mediation in
this area do not seem to warrant such a sweeping duty. A tight timetable
limits the intensity of the duty to rnediate by holding the potential delay
97. A clause can also provide for binding arbitration in this instance.
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within predictable bounds.
The enforcement of the duty seeks to strike a balance between
effectiveness and proportionality. The sanctions build on the plaintiffs
interest to find a remedy quickly and the defendant's interest in avoiding
cost" and gaining time.
V. CONCLUSION
Before mandating mediation, the legislators, judges, or parties who
contemplate it should analyze the type of controversy concerned, check
for significant power imbalances and clarify which barriers to mediation
they want to overcome. It will not always be possible to discover all
potential power imbalances and barriers to mediation on a general level.
However, the analysis performed will yield a better basis for mandating
mediation than considerations of just a single dimension, such as the
backlog of court cases. If this initial analysis indicates mandatory
mediation is warranted; legislators, judges, or parties should tailor the
content of the duty (presence, information, or good faith participation) to
the barriers they have identified. Finally, they should design sanctions
that are efficient and proportional, taking into account the different
positions of the parties.
Investigating different types of controversies has shown that
mandatory mediation is appropriate in cases where the parties have an
ongoing relationship, often on a contractual or institutional basis. This
pattern suggests that mandates to mediate should be rooted in the legal and
institutional structures of specific relationships rather than in the general
framework of a court's procedural rules, applicable to all disputes brought
before it. The court's procedural rules may extend only as far as
informing parties about mediation at a screening session without,
however, imposing mediation.9
The findings about the specific content and the enforcement of the
duty to mediate point in the same direction: both are highly dependent on
the specific relationship and there are advantages to specifying them early.
In the context of a relationship, duties to mediate can be understood as a
substantive mutual obligation of the parties rather than as a procedural
98. Rogers and McEwen even propose to include liquidated damages in mediation
clauses as an incentive to comply. See ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 8, at 68.
99. See supra part IV.B.2.
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requirement imposed by the courts or legislatures."m This perspective
suggests that parties should be enabled to devise and change'0 1 duties to
mediate. This conclusion supports an incorporation of mandatory
mediation into the parties' handling of disputes before they even reach the
courts.'su As a result, duties to mediate would have a better chance to
change the way controversies are resolved before they reach the courts.
100. .However, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that "ihe duty [to mediate] is purely
procedural. Mediation is only an additional procedural step in the foreclosure process, and
not an alteration of substantive rights." First Nat'l Bank in Lenox v. Heimke, 407 N.W.2d
344.(Iowa 1987). But this assessment has no basis in the language and design of the statute
and is probably motivated by narrow considerations to uphold the retroactive applicability
that was intended by the legislature.
101. See supra part IV.B.l about the modification or opting out of general mediation
duties through "negative" clauses. These would be hard to imagine in the case of
court-imposed procedural requirements.
102. See AMF, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(emphasizing the benefits of the "self-regulatory system" the nonbinding arbitration instituted
and held it was enforceable).

